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ARTICLES
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF LEGALESE IN THE
COURSE OF DUE PROCESS, FROM ARREST TO
PLEA BARGAIN: THE PERSPECTIVES OF
DISADVANTAGED OFFENDERS
SHIV NARAYAN PERSAUD*
INTRODUCTION
"Equal protection" and "due process of law" are constitutional
guarantees tenaciously embraced by all Americans.' While numerous
studies focused on how these guarantees play out in the lives of of-
fenders, few sought to examine these guarantees from the standpoint
of offenders,2 particularly those from disadvantaged socio-economic
backgrounds.3
Guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution, the Equal Protection Clause makes clear, in part, that, "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
* Visiting Professor of Law, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, 2008; J.D.
Florida State University, 1997. I would like to thank Roscoe Turnquest for his invaluable re-
search assistance.
1. "Americans believe that people should be entitled to a series of hearings and other
procedural steps in which their guilt is proven, before they should be subjected to punishments
such as the loss of liberty through incarceration." GEORGE COLE & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 230-31 (5th ed. 2008).
2. See JEFFREY Ross & STEPHEN RICHARDS, CONVICT CRIMINOLOGY 349 (Wadsworth
2003). In recent years, a group of Criminologists began in earnest to focus their efforts on exam-
ining the criminal justice system from within, from the perspectives of people who experienced
life behind bars. Identifying themselves as Convict Criminologists, these scholars argued that
those claiming to be experts in criminal justice have had "little or no firsthand experience with
how human beings experience the criminal justice system [and] simply do not comprehend the
profound impact imprisonment has on many individuals." As a result, a truly informed under-
standing of how the legal processes actually play out in the lives of people is yet to be fully
realized. Id.
3. As used in this paper, "disadvantaged socio-economic" background refers to the poor
whose income falls below 200 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines. The term is used synon-
ymously with the term "indigent."
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law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."4
This Constitutional guarantee of equal protection afforded to citi-
zens under the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from denying
or depriving any person protection for any reason, whether as a result
of their race, class, age, gender, religion, national origin, disability,
etc.5 It also provides for the right to "due process of law," a right also
guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment.6
The U.S. Constitution actually contains two due process of law
clauses. The Fifth Amendment reads, "No person shall . . . be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . .. ."
Due to an early Supreme Court ruling which held that the Bill of
Rights restricts only the actions of the national government, a second
due process clause was included in the Fourteenth Amendment which
was adopted shortly after the Civil War. That amendment reads, "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. . ." There was widespread belief that another due
process clause was needed to protect the newly freed slaves from vin-
dictive actions at the hands of southern state governments.7
It seems clear that the Constitutional guarantee of "due process of
law" is not only a function of the national government, but that of
states and local governments as well.' National and state govern-
ments, in the promulgation and implementation of policies, must take
every precaution not to deprive anyone of life, liberty or property. 9
Due process ... does not restrict the State to any particular mode of
procedure. It protects against the exercise of arbitrary governmental
power and guarantees equal and impartial dispensation of law accord-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See JAMES CALVI & SUSAN COLEMAN, AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 150-51
(4th ed. 2000) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause "was designed to prevent discrimina-
tion against the newly freed slaves," and later expanded by the Supreme Court, through a series
of rulings to include such things as race).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. CALVI, supra note 5, at 146-59.
8. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).
9. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) (citations omitted) ("In 1883,
[the Supreme Court] affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment
between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct,
'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no
shield. [Later, the Court went on to state that c]areful adherence to the 'state action' require-
ment preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal
judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for
conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed. A major consequence is to require the courts to
respect the limits of their own power as directed against state governments and private interests.
Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order .... First, the
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a
rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible ....
Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor.").
2
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ing to the settled course of judicial proceedings or in accordance with
fundamental principles of distributive justice.' °
The right to due process guaranteed through the Fifth Amendment
also provides citizens protection against "self-incrimination."" Spe-
cifically, the Amendment states that, "No person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."1" In
short, a person should not be forced or pressured into providing self
incriminating information.13 If such a situation occurs, then this
would constitute a violation of a person's Fifth Amendment right.
[The Supreme Court has stated that] the accusatorial system has be-
come a fundamental part of the fabric of our society and, hence, is
enforceable against the States . . . . [T]he guarantees of the First
Amendment... the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
of the Fourth Amendment... and the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment . . are all to be enforced against the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards
that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment. In the
coerced confession cases, involving the policies of the privilege itself,
there has been no suggestion that a confession might be considered
coerced if used in a federal but not a state tribunal. The Court thus has
rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the
States only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual...
What is accorded is a privilege of refusing to incriminate one's self,
and the feared prosecution may be by either federal or state authori-
ties .... It would be incongruous to have different standards deter-
mine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or
federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether
an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is
justified. 14
Given that "equal protection" and "due process" are fundamentally
constituted in the very fabric of Americans' daily existence, how do
these guaranteed rights play out in the lives of the disadvantaged of-
fenders, especially as they unfold in the course of arrest to plea bar-
gain? In addition, considering that these constitutional rights are
10. Green v. State, 247 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1968)
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
12. Id.
13. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 189-90 (2004) ("To qualify
for the Fifth Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and
compelled .... '[T]o be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implic-
itly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information' ..... The Fifth Amendment [further] pro-
hibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating [with a real and appreciable apprehension
by the] 'witness [who] reasonably believes [that the disclosure] could be used in a criminal prose-
cution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."') (citations omitted).
14. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
2009]
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interwoven into the very core of the American Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, how do they translate into and take on meanings in a complex
array of legal dictums? And how comprehensible is the legal language
to disadvantaged offenders?
To have some insight into the comprehensibility of the legal lan-
guage relating to equal protection and due process, this paper will fo-
cus on some pertinent terms and phrases commonly used by law
enforcement officers and the courts, in the course of arrest to plea
bargain, to assess whether they are clearly understood by disadvan-
taged offenders.
DISADVANTAGED OFFENDERS AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Comparatively speaking, disadvantaged individuals are arrested and
imprisoned at a higher rate and with greater regularity than the non-
disadvantaged.' 5 Many of these disadvantaged offenders grew out of
the Juvenile Justice system that has served as a protection mechanism
for the economically privileged.16
The juvenile justice system has too long been a disposal unit for chil-
dren of the poor. The lack of social justice for the poor and minority
groups is a grave indictment of our society. At the same time that
heavy-handed ministrations of the state have harshly processed the
poor, the justice system has worked very hard at saving the 'saved' -
the middle class youths who have committed minor offenses. 7
Armed with empirical information,18 criminal justice scholars and
public advocacy groups alike cite arrest rates and the lack of legal rep-
15. See RAYMOND MICHALOWSKI, SOCIAL CLASS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN INVESTIGATING
DIFFERENCE 56-73 (2d ed. 2008).
16. Because many states have expanded their juvenile codes, more juveniles have found
themselves in adult courts through waivers. See KATHERINE BECKETr & THEODORE SASSON,
THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE 184-185 (Pine Forge Press 2000).
The rate of incarceration of lower-class and minority citizens is indeed greater than their
higher rates of offending would justify .... The fact that such a high percentage of young
African American men are behind bars must be understood in terms of what these young
men cannot be doing. They cannot be earning a living, attending school, parenting their
children, or supporting their partners .... [W]e also must wonder whether this experience
might not further alienate this group and prevent them from identifying with the society
that sent them there.
TODD R. CLEAR ET AL., AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 485, 490 (8th ed. 2009).
17. CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & STUART J. MILLER, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 536 (4th
ed. 2005); see generally JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON
(8th ed. 2007) (citing numerous studies to show that the poor are arrested, charged and prose-
cuted at a higher rate than the rich; and that African Americans are arrested, charged, prose-
cuted and convicted at a higher rate than whites); see also BRIAN J. SMITH, THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF RACE, IN INVESTIGATING DIFFERENCE 111 (2d ed. 2008).
18. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001 1 (2003), http://www.ojp.
usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/piusp0l.pdf. ("About 1 in 3 black males, 1 in 6 Hispanic males, and 1 in 17
white males are expected to go to prison during their lifetime, if current incarceration rates
remain unchanged.").
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resentation among the principal reasons for the disproportionate
number of disadvantaged individuals in the prison system.1 9 Rarely
assessed as a critical factor in this overrepresentation is the offenders'
lack of knowledge and understanding of the language governing the
legal system.2° Although affected by the legal expressions and termi-
nologies associated with "equal protection" and "due process" as they
unfold in the course of arrest to adjudication, many disadvantaged of-
fenders seldom disclose their lack of knowledge and understanding of
these expressions and terminoloties.21 Most often, they remain lost in
the jungle of legalese because they are either discouraged that the sys-
tem will not take the time to help them understand or believe that the
more questions asked only slows down the process of getting them out
of the system.22
CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE LANGUAGE OF LAW
The violation of a suspect's rights to due process has received con-
siderable attention from the Supreme Court.23 Because of this, states
have promulgated policies to safeguard the rights of suspects from the
time of arrest onward.24 Presumably, the legal procedures governing
the course of arrest to plea bargain are articulated in a language un-
derstandable to the common person.
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a crimi-
nal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair no-
tice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The
underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsi-
19. See BARTOLLAS, supra note 17; see generally MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, JUSTICE BLIND?
IDEALS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-6 (Prentice Hall 3d ed. 2009) (2002)
(exploring general injustices in the American criminal justice system).
20. Criminologists and other social scientists regularly make references, or call attention, to
the low level of education among disadvantaged prisoners, especially African Americans. Few,
however, have focused their analysis on the offenders' actual understanding of the legal lan-
guage as it applies to them.
21. See ROBINSON, supra note 19; see also REIMAN, supra note 17.
22. While serving as an assistant public defender and assistant state attorney, I came face to
face with many clients who had a lack of understanding of the most basic concepts, especially
their fundamental rights and the legal consequences of their actions. The vast majority of indi-
viduals whom I represented as a defense attorney often nodded or verbally indicated that they
understood the legal process as it was being explained to them. Even though many completed
high school, they spoke in sentences replete with colloquial expressions, and seldom made
known their lack of understanding of the legal system.
23. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128 (1959) ("Decisions under the Due Process Clause
require close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. The Anglo-
American system of law is based not upon transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of
society ascertained as best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed by the
best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.").
24. Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Once states have promulgated laws to
define criminal conduct, however, federal due process protects a defendant from conviction un-
less he is shown in a fair proceeding to have violated those laws.").
2009]
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ble for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.25
In a later decision, the Court further clarified the potential conse-
quences of laws that are not clear by stating that:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we in-
sist that laws give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable op-
portunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to police [of-
ficers], judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory appli-
cation. Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut(s) upon sensi-
tive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit
the exercise of (those) freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone.., than if the bounda-
ries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked., 26
These "potential consequences" have a tremendous impact on persons
of common intelligence and understanding. The language of the law,
therefore, plays a critical role in the delineation of unacceptable con-
duct, proper law-enforcement standards and the fair dispensation of
justice. Worded in terms and phrases that a person of ordinary intelli-
gence finds difficult to understand, laws can result in the miscarriage
of justice.27
In determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague on the
facts at hand, [the courts] apply a two-part test. First, the statute must
provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. Second, the stat-
ute must not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. A penal statute is
void if it does not sufficiently define a criminal offense so that ordi-
nary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. This inquiry
looks at what a person of "common intelligence" would "reasonably"
25. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
26. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
27. See ANNA LUKEMEYER, HELPING CHILDREN LEFr BEHIND 59-86 (John Ymger ed.,
Mass. Inst. of Tech. Press 2004). "Ordinary intelligence" and "common intelligence" are elusive
phrases which, by themselves, can be characterized as vague. Definitions of ordinary or common
intelligence could range from people with no formal schooling to someone who is a high school
dropout. For the purpose of this paper, these terms are used in reference to disadvantaged
adults whose level of education is at or below high school. It is arguable that someone with a
high school education would not be considered a person of "common or ordinary intelligence."
However among disadvantaged groups, the acquisition of high school education is not a reliable
indicator of one's comprehension level. Courts over the years have found that the education
level of children of disadvantaged backgrounds lags behind those of the affluent. Id.
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understand the statute to proscribe, not what the particular defendant
understood the statute to mean.2 8
The concern over vagueness of laws and terms associated with them
then begs the question: Are the legal terms and phrases inherent in,
or associated with the application of the law truly so clear that they
can be grasped by someone of ordinary intelligence? The answer to
this question is not simple, given the wide array and varying complexi-
ties of terms and phrases used in the construction and implementation
of laws. Since it is almost impossible to evaluate the vagueness in all
laws, this study seeks to take one small, but important, step in assess-
ing disadvantaged offenders' understanding of some of the basic legal
terms and phrases used in the course of due process. 29
COMING FACE TO FACE WITH DISADVANTAGED OFFENDERS'
LACK OF UNDERSTANDING
My initial awareness of disadvantaged offenders' lack of under-
standing with legalese came about during my tenure as an assistant
public defender in Leon County Florida.3" Knowing that clients relied
on me for the best possible defense, I took great pains in reviewing
their case files and conducting repeated interviews with them. Though
tedious, the process of fact-finding became my preoccupation. Within
weeks of reviewing cases, interviewing and re-interviewing clients, a
distinct pattern of clients' misapprehension of their rights and due
process became evident. Initially, I felt that it was their way of "play-
ing the con-game" or denying their guilt. Probing further, I soon dis-
covered that a vast majority of my disadvantaged clients did not
understand some of their basic rights and became frustrated with
many of the legal concepts and phrases I thought to be simple.3
28. United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added and cita-
tions omitted).
29. JAMES ANTHONY WHITSON, CONSTITUTION AND CURRICULUM 240 (Falmer Press 1991).
An understanding of the legal system and due process by disadvantaged offenders continues to
be a problematic issue for law enforcement and the courts. Examined primarily by social scien-
tists, this issue has yet to capture the interest of legal scholars, many of whom have arguably
relied on "experts" from outside the legal field when confronted with poorly educated or un-
dereducated clients. Id.
30. While employed as an assistant public defender in Leon County, Florida, I represented
indigent suspects, the majority of whom were young minority males with limited formal educa-
tion who had difficulty understanding the charges against them. Afterwards, as an assistant state
attorney in Seminole County, Florida, I began to have a better understanding of the depth of
indigent defendants' difficulty with procedural due process and the legal terminology associated
with the system.
31. For example, a client charged with assault and battery insisted that he "didn't done no
such thing," when he picked up his girlfriend and carried her out of the house during an argu-
ment because he wanted to avoid hurting her. "How can that be assault and battery when I ain't
hit her?" he asked repeatedly. In another case, the client believed that lightly slapping his girl-
friend while she was crying was not battery and had trouble understanding why he couldn't see
20091
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For example, Damon (pseudonym), a repeat drug offender vehe-
mently denied that he ever had drugs in his possession. The police, he
claimed, were out to "get him" because he drove a nice car.32 After
several hours of frustrating interviews, I discovered that Damon un-
derstood "drug possession" to mean that the drug must be on his per-
son, and that the small quantity of drugs the cops found in his car
could not truly be drug possession.33 As he insisted, "How can drugs
in my car be drug possession; my momma's hat is in my car, is that hat
my possession? No, that's my momma's hat. '34 Then, there was Eric;
arrested for a violation of probation and assault on a police officer. He
insisted that the "charge be dropped" because "he accidentally
touched the cop" when he jerked his head to let his dreadlocks fall
backwards.35
In almost all of the instances of wrongdoing which demonstrated a
misapprehension of legal concepts, the disadvantaged offenders ex-
pressed confusion over their arrests or charges against them. Ques-
tioning them on whether they understood their rights often brought
forth responses such as, "What rights?" or "What you mean by
rights?" or "I know my rights, I ain't got none. 36
Given my rudimentary knowledge of disadvantaged offenders mis-
apprehension of legal terms and concepts and the paucity of informa-
tion on the subject, I felt it would be beneficial to undertake an
empirical investigation, albeit limited in nature, in an attempt to have
some understanding of the pervasiveness of the problem. To this end,
I decided to inquire from disadvantaged African American offend-
her, as there was a no-contact provision on his bond, and they were getting married that
weekend.
32. I met Damon while working as an assistant public defender in Leon County. He
claimed that he was targeted by the police because he drove a Ford Expedition with expensive
rims.
33. The police found a small quantity of marijuana in the glove compartment of Damon's
car. He claimed that since the drugs were not found on him, the police had no right to arrest him
for drug possession. He insisted that he knew nothing of the marijuana and that anyone could
have left it in his car since he gave rides to anyone who asked.
34. Damon argued that his mother often left her hat in his car, and that he cannot claim his
mother's hat as his, because it is not. The marijuana, he argued,was not his, so why should he
claim it.
35. While on probation Eric was seen driving back and forth behind a store where his friend
worked. Stopped by the police on suspicion, he was arrested for violating probation. When the
arresting officer tried to handcuff him, he jerked his head backwards hitting the officer in the
face. He claimed that he jerked his head backwards because his dreadlocks were rubbing against
his eyes.
36. Working as an assistant public defender, I always explained to disadvantaged clients
their rights and asked if they understood them. Most regularly, clients responded with such
questions as, "What rights?" or "What do you mean by rights?" While a few were quick to
inform me that they knew their rights by stating that they didn't have any. As Eric said to me, "I
know my rights; I ain't got none."
8
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ers3 7 their understanding of the Miranda Rights38 and follow-up with a
few regularly used legal concepts.
METHODOLOGY
This study utilizes a mixed method approach involving library and
internet research, followed by a short survey and in-depth face to face
interviews with participant offenders.39
Participants: From a convenient sampleaOof thirty-nine disadvan-
taged male African American offenders, twenty-four were randomly
selected 41 to participate in this study. Ranging between ages 19 and
30,42 the selected participants either served time in jail, prison or
both.43 All have committed crimes in different parts of the State of
Florida 44 for which they plea bargained; and all received legal gui-
37. For the purposes of this study, disadvantaged African American offenders refer to indi-
viduals between ages 19 through 30 whose income is below 200 percent of the Federal poverty
guidelines and whose formal education is at or below the high school level. In the criminal Jus-
tice system, being a disadvantaged offender is often characterized as being of indigent status.
Disadvantaged as used in this paper incorporates the definition of indigent including a person's
low level of education. The reason for the incorporation of educational level and income into
the definition of disadvantaged is because these two characteristics, for the most part, are highly
correlated. "The problems of lower-class culture are particularly acute for racial minorities and
ethnic minorities who have income level significantly below that of whites and an unemployment
rate almost twice as high. In the inner cities, more than half of all black men do not finish high
school." LARRY SIEGAL, THE ESSENTIALS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63-65 (6th ed. 2009). "Most
convicted offenders sentenced to a term of imprisonment are poor, uneducated and underem-
ployed." ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 281. In today's society, a high school education alone does
not adequately prepare a person to successfully compete in the globally expanding labor market.
See JEANNE BALLANTINE AND FLOYD HAMMACK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 446 (6th ed.
2009) (noting that because the labor market is increasingly demanding, a college education is a
necessity with a Master's degree increasingly becoming a requirement for employment).
38. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. The term "participants" refers to African American offenders from whom information
was collected for this study.
40. See DONALD H. MCBURNEY & THERESA L. WHITE, RESEARCH METHODS 248 (Wad-
sworth 6th ed. 2003) (noting that a convenience sample is commonly defined as a non-random
sample, one that is chosen for practical reasons).
41. Participant offenders included in this study were selected through a random process in
which they were identified by the numbers 1 through 39. Placing the numbers in a paper bag, 24
were randomly pulled, thereby giving everyone in the group an equal and independent chance of
being selected. Data gathering took place from June through early August 2008, primarily
Fridays, Saturdays, and some Sundays.
42. See BONCZAR, supra note 18. See also PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2004 11 (2005), available at www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/pjim04.pdf (last visited Nov. 2008)
("An estimated 13% of black males in their late twenties [were] in prison or jail in 2004."). The
reason for the selection of participants between ages 19-30 was due to the fact that incarceration
data indicate that African American males over age 18 are four to five times more likely to be
incarcerated than Caucasians, and are also more likely to be incarcerated before they are age 30.
43. Most of the participants served time in jail ranging from one month to under a year. A
few served time in prison ranging from 18 months to three and a half years.
44. The majority of participants lived and had committed criminal offenses in the southern
region of Florida. The rest were from North and Central Florida.
9
Persaud: Conceptualizations of Legalese in the Course of Due Process, from
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
116 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:107
dance or representation from public defenders or pro-bono attorneys.
None of the participants acquired an education beyond the high
school level."a
Selection Procedure: Participants included in this study followed a
two-step selection approach. First, three offenders known to a friend
of the author agreed to participate. They assisted in identifying and
soliciting the participation of others. Using the snow-ball sampling
method a6 a group of thirty-three offenders were identified and con-
tacted.47 Out of this total, thirty-one agreed to voluntarily participate
in the study. Second, the thirty-one volunteers were screened through
short interviews to ensure that they were: (i) between the ages of
nineteen and thirty, and that they did not possess an education be-
yond the high school level; 8 (ii) arrested and read their Miranda
Rights; and (iii) represented by a public defender or pro bono attor-
ney at least once and plea bargained the charges against them.
By way of the screening method outlined above, twenty-four indi-
viduals were identified as having met the selection criteria for partici-
pation in this study. These individuals were then interviewed at some
length about their experiences with the criminal justice system.
Interview Questions: To develop interview questions and investigate
the conceptualizations of legalese from the perspective of offenders of
disadvantaged backgrounds, plea bargain forms used in Leon, Orange,
Broward and Dade Counties in Florida were selected. 9 After review-
ing these forms, a list of words and phrases was created and cross-
referenced to identify terms that appear on all of the forms. A few
words and phrases commonly used in the process of plea bargaining
were added to the list. Constructing a list of terms and phrases in this
fashion facilitated a pre-test in which participant offenders were asked
to identify the terms, which they heard in relation to their own case.50
From the feedback provided by offenders, an interview guide contain-
45. Nine participants readily admitted that they dropped out of high school. None acquired
an education beyond high school.
46. See RANJIT KUMAR, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE FOR BEGIN-
NERS 179 (Sage Publications 2d ed. 2005) (explaining that snow-ball sampling is a selection pro-
cess using people who are connected to one another).
47. For this study, the three known offenders were asked to identify others who would be
willing to participate in the study, and they, in turn, were asked to identify others.
48. Three individuals were excluded because they had some college education.
49. Since the participant offenders committed crimes in Leon, Orange, Broward, and Dade
counties, the plea bargain forms from these counties were reviewed to identify and select words
and phrases commonly used.
50. Pre-testing the original list was done in order to validate the terms and phrases selected
for use in this study.
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ing both open and close-ended questions51 was developed to solicit
feedback from the voluntary participants.52
Interview Process: Interviews were voluntary and conducted with
individual offenders over a two month period. Interview methodology
followed the structured, semi-structured and unstructured ap-
proaches.53 Each interview lasted between one and two hours. Often,
interviews ended with a discussion between two or three participants.
On these occasions, informal discussion provided insight into an of-
fender's understanding or misunderstanding of the legal process. In a
few instances, a quasi-focus group interview approach5 4 was used to
gather follow-up information from three or four individuals at a time.
EMERGENCE OF MIRANDA IN EQUAL PROTECTION
AND DUE PROCESS
For Americans, the Miranda Rights emerged from the judicial sys-
tem to become the first step in ensuring that the individual, as a citi-
zen of the United States, understands that he or she is entitled to the
constitutional rights of equal protection and due process.55 After Mi-
randa, the term "Miranda Rights" or "Miranda Warnings" (used inter-
changeably), has become the mainstay verbal warning prior to a
custodial police interrogation. 56 However, Miranda did not become a
mainstay without challenges. In 1968, two years after the Court's rul-
ing in Miranda, Congress enacted a statute, which attempted to super-
51. See McBURNEY & WHITE, supra note 40 (noting that open ended questions refer to
those that allow respondents to provide complete answers in their own words without any re-
strictions from the researcher). Close-ended questions, commonly referred to as fixed choice
questions limited the respondents to selecting from a list of responses. Id.
52. All of the participants were informed about the study and its purpose before they
agreed to voluntarily participate.
53. See generally BRUCE L. BERG, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 69-72 (Allyn & Bacon 4th ed. 2001) Interviews with respondents followed the struc-
tured (standardized), unstructured (un-standardized) and semi-structured (semi-standardized)
approaches in order to ensure the reliability and validity of the information collected. The struc-
tured form with standardized questions was utilized to collect specific information, while the
semi-structure was used to ask a question and probe for information beyond the answers pro-
vided, and the unstructured simply allowed respondents to "just talk" about their experiences
with the legal system. Id.
54. See id. Discussions were coordinated with three or four respondents in which the re-
searcher primarily listened to the discussions of respondents while observing their interactions.
Sometimes, the researcher participated in the discussions as a way to guide the discourse.
55. See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-35 (2000) (historical account
of the law governing the admission of confessions). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (establishing the rights discussed herein).
56. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434-35 (explaining that admissibility in evidence of any state-
ment given during a custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether police pro-
vided the suspect with Miranda warnings). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
2009]
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sede Miranda and institute "voluntary confessions" as admissible
evidence.57 This attempt failed.
In upholding Miranda, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "We hold
that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be
in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule
Miranda ourselves. '5 8 In so holding, the Court noted that "Miranda
has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where
the warnings have become part of our national culture."59 The Mi-
randa Court concluded that the individual rights ought to be guaran-
teed and that individual freedom should not be deprived.6" In
summary, the Court's ruling in Miranda sought to protect the individ-
ual from self-incrimination and forced interrogation thereby ensuring
that he or she would not be deprived of their civil liberties without
due process of law.6'
While established in part to safeguard a suspect's Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights and privileges, the Supreme Court sought it
wise not to be too prescriptive and thereby did not insist on a stan-
dardized wording of the Miranda Rights.62 Instead, the Court offered
the guidelines to be adopted by law enforcement in the articulation of
Miranda.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation,
he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has
the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the
warning is needed simply to make them aware of it - the threshold
requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More impor-
tant, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the in-
herent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the
subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's im-
precations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation
will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face
of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a
jury. Further, the warning will show the individual that his interro-
gators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to ex-
ercise it.63
57. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435.
58. Id. at 432.
59. Id. at 443.
60. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459-60 ("Those who framed our Constitution and the
Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty .... We cannot
depart from this noble heritage.").
61. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 478-79.
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490 ("Congress and the States are free to develop their own safe-
guards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in inform-
ing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise
it.").
63. Id. at 467-68.
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In offering these guidelines, the Court sought to preserve the rights of
a person in custody, and that these rights should not be violated by
law enforcement officers seeking evidence against him or her.' "The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."65
[I]t is clear that prior to any custodial interrogation, law enforcement
officers are required to administer the Miranda warnings to the person
about to be questioned. The formula should be as easy as 1 + 1 = 2;
that is, "custody" + "interrogation" = the requirement that Miranda
warnings be given .... For law enforcement, the desired, ultimate
result is the acquisition of a valid confession, fully admissible at trial.
In order for that to occur, officers are at all times required to scrupu-
lously honor each of the rights contained within the Miranda
66warnings.
Heeding the Court's decision and recommendation, law enforcement
agencies sought to construct warnings in order to fulfill the require-
ments of Miranda and to make them comprehensible to the average
citizen without compromising the rights therein.67
SIGNIFICANCE OF MIRANDA IN EQUAL PROTECTION
AND DUE PROCESS
The significance of Miranda within the constitutional realm of equal
protection and due process can be found in a series of Court rulings
dealing with questions regarding the violation of suspects' rights
against self-incrimination. 68 Despite its significance, the fact remains
that not everyone questioned by the police while in custody must be
"Mirandized."
69
64. See id.
65. Id. at 444.
66. See LARRY E. HOLTZ, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 646 (7th ed. 2001).
67. A cursory review of randomly selected Miranda rights from various states indicates a
wide array of wordings used by law enforcement agencies across the nation, all seeking to sim-
plify the rights in order to make them clear to the ordinary individual. "[T]he Supreme Court has
never indicated that Miranda requires any precise formulation of the warnings given criminal
defendants. 'Miranda itself indicates that no talismanic incantation is required to satisfy its stric-
tures.' Instead, the inquiry for reviewing courts is to determine whether the warnings reasonably
convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda." Brown v. Crosby, 249 F. Supp.2d 1285,
1305 (S.D.Fla., 2003) (citations omitted).
68. See generally United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (citations omitted) (holding,
in part, that the officers' failure to give Miranda warnings in conjunction with restraining-order
arrest did not require suppression of weapon at firearms trial, since weapon was recovered based
on defendant's voluntary statement that he possessed it).
69. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995) (citations omitted) ("The Court defined
'custodial interrogation' as 'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."').
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[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to
everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to
be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police sus-
pect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was
that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was
made applicable, and to which it is limited.7 °
While the Court made clear the importance of a suspect's rights as
stipulated in Miranda, and when it should be administered, violations
do occur.71
When violated, these rights can be of serious consequence to the
Nation, States or Municipalities as in the form of failed convictions,
miscarriage of justice, or stern admonitions from the courts.72 For ex-
ample, if a serial killer or child molester gains his release because of
the violation of his Miranda Rights, he could be free to travel else-
70. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
71. Id. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (confession of defendant to cannabis
charge was deemed forced where police threatened to cut off financial aid for defendant's chil-
dren unless she cooperated); see also Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999) (interroga-
tion of defendant on murder charge after an unanswered request for counsel was deemed
psychologically coercive where after several hours, the statements amounted incoherent
ramblings); see also United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that, al-
though trickery is not per se prohibited in obtaining a confession, a post-Miranda statement is
deemed forced where the police require that the defendant choose between cooperating or
speaking to an attorney).
72. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (holding
that a second confession to murder obtained mid-interrogation after Miranda may not have been
voluntary and should have been suppressed); United States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437, 443 (4th
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) ("We believe that in most cases, the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of Miranda from the government's case-in-chief at trial will provide ample deter-
rence against police misconduct. For example, as a result of the Miranda-Edwards violations
here, the Government was required to dismiss two of the three charges against [Defendant-
Appellee] - including a firearm charge that carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years
imprisonment, required to be served consecutively to any other sentence."); United States v.
Moss, 217 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2000) (Gilman J., concurring) ("Ordering that a serious drug
indictment be dismissed with prejudice solely because of a procedural violation is highly unpalat-
able. [The] enforcement of the rules established in Miranda and in search and seizure cases
sometimes requires the exclusion of critical evidence for the prosecution-because there is no
other adequate means of deterring unacceptable governmental behavior .... ).
The Miranda rule is not, nor did it ever claim to be, a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself.
The Miranda Court implicitly acknowledged as much when it indicated that procedures
other than the warnings dictated by the Court's opinion might satisfy constitutional con-
cerns, and what was implicit in the Miranda opinion itself has been made explicit in our
subsequent cases. Like all prophylactic rules, the Miranda rule 'overprotects' the value at
stake. In the name of efficient judicial administration of the Fifth Amendment guarantee
and the need to create institutional respect for Fifth Amendment values, it sacrifices soci-
ety's interest in uncovering evidence of crime and punishing those who violate its laws.
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209-10 (1989) (O'Connor J., concurring) (citations omitted);
see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 729 (1979) (noting that the Court has previously "ad-
monished that 'the greatest care must be taken to assure that [a minor's] admission was
voluntary"').
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where including out of the state where he committed the crime,
thereby providing him opportunities to once more commit such hei-
nous acts.73 In contrast, if an individual, not cognizant of or lacking
the ability to clearly understand his rights to due process, confesses to
a crime he did not commit, he is likely to be found guilty and impris-
oned for a prolonged period.74
Given the importance of Miranda in the course of due process and
in upholding the rights of suspects, I decided to gather information
from disadvantaged African American offenders to assess their under-
standing and experience of Miranda. Three major reasons guided this
focus on disadvantaged African American offenders:
(i) Disadvantaged African American offenders constitute an over-
represented group within the prison population.75
73. WENDY MURPHY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN EXPoSE OF THE LAWYERS AND JUDGES
WHO LET DANGEROUS CRIMINALS Go FREE 235 (2007) ("Just as wrapping child pornography in
the flag demeans the First Amendment, using technical Miranda violations to insist that murder
charges be dismissed does not track with the intent of the Fifth Amendment, and it diminishes
the seriousness of other more extreme violations of constitutional rights. But this is exactly what
some defense attorneys were clamoring for in early 2006 when the judge in Florida handling the
prosecution of John Couey for the brutal rape and murder of little Jessica Lunsford threw out
Couey's confession on the grounds it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The sim-
plest way to state the legal issue is that the confession was excluded because the police did not
stop questioning the suspect after he indicated that he wanted a lawyer . . . . Some defense
attorneys actually argued that not only should self-incriminating statements obtained incorrectly
be suppressed, which is entirely appropriate, but a confessed child murderer should get a total
pass to teach the cops a lesson and protect liberty for all of us.").
74. IRVING B. WEINER ET AL., 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 349 (2003) (citations omit-
ted) ("For several reasons, it is difficult to reliably measure the rate of false confessions. Defend-
ants may claim to have given an untrue confession to avoid responsibility for their criminal acts.
The 'proof' of a false confession is typically established by physical evidence of innocence (e.g.,
DNA testing) in the presence of a confession or by the subsequent arrest of another person who
admits committing the same crime (with accompanying physical evidence to support the new
confession). The lack of a 'clearinghouse' for gathering such information makes accurate data
impossible .... [Several studies, however,] provide case examples of false confessions by inno-
cent individuals, some of which resulted in executions for crimes they did not commit."); see also
Michigan v. Kirschke, an unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided July
8, 2008 (Docket No. 277853) where the defendant was sentenced to 25-40 years imprisonment,
and stated afterward he did not understand his Miranda rights which was admittedly understood
at the time of his confession to armed robbery, could not argue the contrary on appeal.
75. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2005 8 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdflp05.pdf ("At year end 2005,
black males (547,200) outnumbered white males (459,700) and Hispanic males (279,000) among
inmates with a sentence of more than 1 year. About 40% of all male inmates sentenced to more
than 1 year were black."); see also WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 7 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.us-
doj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf ("[As of 2007, black males ages 30 to 34 had the highest custody
incarceration rate of any race, age, or gender group. Of the 2.3 million inmates in custody, 2.1
million were men and 208,300 were women .... Black males represented the largest percentage
(35.4%) of inmates held in custody, followed by white males (32.9%) and Hispanic males
(17.9%).").
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(ii) Researchers have long argued that the rights of disadvantaged
African Americans are violated more often than that of
Caucasians.76
(iii) Crime data reveal that disadvantaged individuals within the
prison system possess very low levels of education.77
DISADVANTAGED OFFENDERS UNDERSTANDINGS
OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
As a first step in the data collection process, respondents78 were
screened to ascertain whether the police had administered the Mi-
randa Rights to them on at least one occasion. This screening took
the form of a question in which respondents were asked the number
of times the police read them the Miranda Rights since they became
adults.79 Table 1 below captures the number of respondents and the
number of times law enforcement officers read them their rights.
76. See generally KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK (2000) (chronicling how law
enforcement officers regularly use racial profiling to stop, question and search and even arrest
blacks in violation of due process); Cf. ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 182, 191 ("In fact, there is
evidence of racial profiling in some places at some times.") Citing the Bureau of Justice Statistics
for year 2006, Robinson notes that Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites "to expe-
rience use of force during contact with police" where force was used. Id. The issue has not been
resolved. In contrast to Meeks, some Criminologists have disputed evidence of racial profiling by
law enforcement officers. Id.
77. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, EDUCATION AND COR-
RECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1-6 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf
("About 41% of inmates in the Nation's State and Federal prisons and local jails in 1997 and
31% of probationers had not completed high school or its equivalent. In comparison, 18% of the
general population age 18 or older had not finished the 12th grade .... Minority State inmates
were generally less educated than their white peers. About 44% of black State prison inmates
and 53% of Hispanic inmates had not graduated from high school or received a GED compared
to 27% of whites in State prisons .... Minorities were less likely than whites to have attended
college or some other institution of higher learning. About 1 in 10 blacks and 1 in 13 Hispanics
had studied beyond high school compared to 1 in 7 whites. Minorities were also less likely than
whites to have earned a high school diploma or a GED: 26% of blacks and 17% of Hispanics,
compared to 30% of whites, had a high school diploma; 30% of blacks and Hispanics passed the
GED compared to 43% of whites."). Low level of education is strongly correlated with
problems of comprehension, which in all likelihood, negatively impacts one's understanding of
legal language. Id.
78. The term "Respondents" refers to disadvantaged African American offenders who par-
ticipated in this study. Offenders agreed to participate only after they were promised that their
responses would be held in confidence and anonymity was assured.
79. Nine respondents disclosed voluntarily that they were arrested as juveniles. The number
of times they were read the Miranda Rights as juveniles is not included in this study. Respon-
dents were asked if they were arrested after their eighteenth birthday and to give the exact
number of times the police read them their rights during these arrests.
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TABLE 1
RESPONDENTS AND THE NUMBER OF TIMES THE
POLICE READ THEM THEIR RIGHTS
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS TIMES EACH MIRANDIZED
3 1
14 2
4 3
3 3+
TOTAL 24
According to the Court's decision in Miranda, certain procedural safe-
guards must be taken to inform accused persons of their rights.8' As
the Court stated, "Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has the right to remain silent, that the statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney."81 Aware of the Court's decision,
respondents were asked if they knew that, when taken into custody,
the police were supposed to inform them of their rights before ques-
tioning them. 81 Fifteen respondents declared that they were unaware
that their rights must be read to them before being questioned by the
police when in custody.83 Some indicated that the police asked them a
few simple questions which they answered because they thought this
was the "right thing to do," or because they "didn't think anything of
it," or they "didn't feel the questions [to be] serious."84 Seven ac-
knowledged that they became aware of the seriousness of such ques-
tions afterwards, while in jail or prison.85
80. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
81. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 444-45. Participant offenders in this study were asked a series of questions which
appear in the appendix of this paper. See app. questions 1-33.
83. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). As a
follow-up to appendix question 11, participant offenders were asked if they knew that when
taken into custody, the police were supposed to inform them of their rights before questioning.
The majority responded that they were not aware of the procedure. The nine who said they
were aware that their rights must be read to them before being questioned acknowledged that
they had multiple arrests and or served two to seven years altogether in jails or prisons where
they learned "a lot" about the legal system. These offenders range in age from 25 to 30. Id.
84. Id. Respondents gave the following as examples of simple questions asked by the police:
(a) Were you home last night around 10 o'clock?; (b) What kind of car do you drive?; (c) What
is the color of your car?; (d) Where do you live?; and (e) How often do you see (name of
acquaintance)? (f) When last were you in the Miami/Tampa/Orlando area?). Id.
85. Id. One respondent said that he learned from a prison inmate that when police ask you,
"Where do you live?" they are trying to find out "if you live close to the scene of the crime,"
especially if "you been to prison before." Id.
2009]
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Inquiring into the point in time of their arrest when the police read
them their rights elicited the following responses reported in Table 2:
TABLE 2
POINT IN TIME POLICE READ RESPONDENTS THE
MIRANDA RIGHTS
RESPONSES NUMBER OF
RESPONDENTS
I don't remember 2
What difference does it make? 3
After handcuffed and put in patrol car 12
At the police station 3
After I refused to give them more information 4
TOTAL 24
A follow-up question to the above revealed that all the respondents
have some awareness of their Miranda rights, for they all mentioned
the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney when they were
asked to identify their rights.86 However, when asked to explain when
they first became aware of these rights, they provided varied re-
sponses, with the majority stating that they "don't remember," were
"not sure," or that they "forgot when."87 A few went beyond answer-
ing the question by reciting the Rights from start to end. 8
THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
The protection against self-incrimination provided through the Fifth
Amendment is perhaps one of the most important guarantees ex-
tended to suspects coming into contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem. 9 More commonly known through the Miranda Warnings as the
86. Id. All of the respondents said they became aware of these rights over time, over the
course of more than one arrest, or by talking to their "hommies" (friends) or members of their
families who served time in jail or prison.
87. Id. Several respondents said they were first read their rights years ago when they be-
came juvenile offenders. Almost all of these respondents stated that "because they were "so
young/small" they didn't understand much of "anything" in reference to their arrests and
charges. Id.
88. Id. Four offenders who spent time in both jail and prison recited the Miranda Warnings
and disclosed that they were read their rights "quite a few" times and therefore remember it "by
heart." Id.
89. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 455 n.2 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (" 'The privilege against self-incrimination 'registers an important advance in the devel-
opment of our liberty - one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.'
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingess to sub-
ject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
18
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right to remain silent, the privilege against self-incrimination serves to
safeguard a suspect from admitting to or confessing to a crime.9"
Given the significance of this right and the Court's declaration that
"the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him,"91 respondents
were asked how many of them remained silent when the police read
them their rights.
Of the twenty-four offenders, thirteen said they did not say any-
thing to the police, three said they don't remember, and eight said that
they "talked back." '92 The primary reason they gave for not saying
anything is that their parents or grandparents, especially mothers and
grandmothers, impressed upon them not to say anything to the police
if they ever were arrested. 93 Some added that they also learned not to
speak to the police from other friends in the streets and the neighbor-
hood.94 This aspect of street-neighborhood learning is perhaps best
captured in the words of one respondent who said, "In my hood, most
of the people I know been in jail, some in jail, or got families in jail." 95
Several echoed the same or similar sentiments in the course of their
interviews. 96
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in
its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load,' our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life,' our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent."').
90. Id.
91. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
92. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app., question 14. The eight Participant Offenders 1; 5; 8; 13; 17; 19; 21 and 24 who claimed they
'talked back", to the police said they did so because they were innocent. They explained that
they tried to tell the police that they did not do anything wrong and saw no reasons for being
stopped.
93. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008). Com-
ing primarily from single parent families within low income communities with high crime rates
and regular law enforcement intervention, respondents' parents and guardians regularly incul-
cated in them the necessity to be cautious of the streets and the police. Id.
94. Id. Growing up in disadvantaged communities that are patrolled frequently by law en-
forcement officers, participant offenders claimed that they learned at an early age from their
neighborhood friends and acquaintances not to trust or say anything to the police. Id.
95. Interview with Participant Offender 8, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). This in-
terviewee's remark is supported in Robinson's observation that "[t]he criminal justice system
disproportionately arrests, convicts, and punishes poor people and people of color." See ROBIN-
SON, supra note 19, at 419.
96. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008). Simi-
lar to the remark made by Participant Offender 8, 23 participant offenders noted in the course
of their interviews that they have either a friend, brother, sister, parent, uncle, aunt, neighbor or
someone they know, who are/were in jail or served time in jail or prison. Id.
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In following up on the eight disadvantaged offenders who said they
did not remain silent, all of them insisted that they "talked back" to
the police because they were "innocent" of any wrong doing.97 They
argued that it was necessary to question "why the police stopped" or
"tried to harass" them when they "did no wrong," or "done do no
wrong."98 Although interviewed separately, all eight expressed the
conviction that had they not said anything, "the police will make up
things" to take them to jail.99 When asked to elaborate, they all dis-
closed that they had prior arrest(s) and, as a result, had little trust for
law enforcement officers.' 00
To acquire an understanding of how ex-offenders interpret the right
to remain silent, each was asked to explain what the phrase meant to
them. Without probing, twenty-two provided answers with almost the
identical phrase, "Don't say nothing [sic] to the police."''1 After
some probing, only six elaborated on their answers that whatever they
say to the police could be used against them in court.10 2
Given that the right to remain silent offers them protection against
self-incrimination,"°3 (i.e., confessing to a crime) respondents were
asked whether they understood the connection between these two
principles. All expressed varying degrees of confusion or doubt re-
garding the connection between the right to remain silent and protec-
tion against self-incrimination.'1 4 Those who disclosed that the police
read them their rights once or twice were more vocal in expressing
their confusion with the phrase protection against self-incrimination
with a few asking angrily, "How [can] the right to remain silent pro-
tect you/me from self-incrimination?" or "What the [expletive de-
leted] is self-incrimination anyway?' 0 5
97. Id. Respondents insisted that if they have done "no wrong," why can't they "say so" to
the police, and that this indicates "black people are judged guilty," before being "proved inno-
cent." Id.
98. Id. (information gathered from interviews with participant offenders in relation to app.
question 14).
99. Id. All eight Participant Offenders said that because they had prior arrests or were still
on probation, they had to explain their innocence because the police will find reasons to re-
arrest them or ask that their probation be revoked. Id.
100. Id. Respondents argued that a "black man" with prior arrest(s), especially for drugs, will
always be suspected of wrongdoing by law enforcement officers who are constantly trying to
extract information from them. Id.
101. Id. Two Participant Offenders, 8 and 21, who said they talked back to the police did not
answer app. question 16. Id.
102. Id. All six of these respondents served prison and jail sentences and that some things
they said "came up in court." Id.
103. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
104. See app. question 17. Asked individually if the right to remain silent has anything to do
with protection against self incrimination, all of the participant offenders said they were not sure
or did not know. Id.
105. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
"What the ... is self-incrimination anyway?" was first asked by Participant Offender 20. In
20
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Although expressed in various ways, their complaints can be
summed up in the phrase repeated by a few, "If you keep your mouth
shut you in trouble, if you open up your mouth you in trouble [or
more trouble].' ' 6 In the course of the interviews, a total of thirteen
respondents disclosed voluntarily that they did not even know what
self-incrimination meant.1 °7
While everyone noted that they learned not to say anything to the
police, seventeen acknowledged that they did not quite understand
the phrase can and will be held against you in a court of law.'0 8 The
following summary helps to illustrate the confusion over the phrase,
the right to remain silent:09
One respondent explained that he had a fight with his girlfriend in
which she hit him several times and came "after" him with a knife. He
"wrestled" her (pulled her arm behind her back), took away the knife,
and pushed her away from him in order to get out of the house. He
then called the police. They came, asked his name and arrested him.
After placing the handcuffs on him, they put him in the back of the
police car and went to talk to his girlfriend. They returned to the car,
read him his rights, and asked him what happened. He explained
what took place. He claimed that since he "didn't do anything wrong"
and was advised if he told the truth, he would not be charged. Instead,
not only was he charged, the prosecutor used some of the same infor-
mation he provided to the police against him in court, particularly the
part where he held her hand behind her back to take away the knife
and then pushing her away so he could get out of the house. Even
though his girlfriend testified on his behalf, he was convicted. He ex-
plained that he never thought that telling the truth would be consid-
ered "self-incrimination" and used against him in court. 1
group discussions several offenders responded in similar ways. Id. (participant offenders' re-
sponses to follow-up on app. question 17).
106. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008) (inter-
view responses from Participant Offenders 1: 13: 18: & 19).
107. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
app. questions 13, 16-19. Given a copy of the Miranda Rights to read, the majority of respon-
dents read it without stumbling. Almost all, however, struggled to explain the meaning of it. All
the participant offenders identified the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney as their
rights. However, they could not provide reasons for being silent, and questioned why they
should remain silent if they were telling the truth. They were also unsure whether the right to an
attorney meant that they had to hire their own lawyer or that they would have a court appointed
lawyer. Id.
108. Id. See app. question 18. See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 ("The warning of the right to
remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of
the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it.").
109. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) ("[I]f a person in custody is to be
subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has
the right to remain silent.").
110. Information provided by Participant Offender 8, quoted in Interview with Participant
Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
2009]
21
Persaud: Conceptualizations of Legalese in the Course of Due Process, from
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
128 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:107
Throughout the interview process, many respondents expressed con-
fusion between the "right to remain silent," and "telling the truth,"
with several claiming that "telling the truth," should have spared them
from being "arrested" or "charged." '
Custodial Interrogation: The right to remain silent inherent in Mi-
randa is intrinsically intertwined with the practice of custodial interro-
gation. 112 To assess respondents understanding of this concept, focus
was first made on the word custody and then interrogation.1 1 3 Accord-
ing to the Court,
A suspect is. . . "in custody" for Miranda purposes when placed under
formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position
would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on free-
dom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal
arrest. The reasonable person through whom we view the situation
must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investi-
gation-that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly ap-
prehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances."'
Using the Court's definition, respondents were asked if they could ex-
plain at what point in time they felt they were taken into custody.
Their responses can be seen in Table 3 below.
111. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008) (in
group discussion ranging between three to eight offenders). Almost all argued why a person
should be arrested and charged if he is telling the truth. And all of the offenders refused to
accept that "truth" is determined by the courts, claiming that police and prosecutors "make-up"
things to gain convictions. Id.
112. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661 (2004) ("Miranda itself held that preinterrogation warnings are re-
quired in the context of custodial interrogations given 'the compulsion inherent in custodial sur-
roundings."'); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) ("[T]he primary
protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings
themselves.").
113. See app. question 25 (a)-(c).
114. United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988).
22
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TABLE 3
RESPONDENTS INTERPRETATION OF POINT IN
TIME TAKEN INTO CUSTODY
RESPONSES # OF RESPONDENTS
When the police cuffed me/put the cuffs on 115  5
When the police read me my rights116  7
When they put me in the police car' 1 7  7
When they took me to the police station ' 8  5
TOTAL 24
Implicit in the above responses is that respondents understood cus-
tody to mean being "under the control of the police," in some form." t9
In conducting further inquiry into their understanding of custody, all
of the respondents equated arrest with custody using the terms inter-
changeably during their conversations. To verify that respondents
were using arrest and custody interchangeably, they were asked to ex-
plain what the words meant to them. Without offering an explana-
tion, almost all asked, "What's the difference?"' 2 °
While respondents seem to have some understanding of custody,
they explained interrogation as being some form of threat or use of
force. Custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."121
In explaining what the words meant to them, they all gave various
115. These five respondents said the police handcuffed them without reading them the
Miranda Rights.
116. These seven respondents explained that the police read them their rights while placing
the handcuffs on them.
117. These seven reported that the police handcuffed them, put them in the police car and
then left to search the area or talk to people. Two of these respondents said that when the police
returned to the car, they read them their rights.
118. These five respondents said they were read their rights after they were taken to the
police station.
119. See Participant offenders' responses to app. question 25 (a) and question 26. In group
discussions, all of the participant offenders argued that that once they were cuffed by the police,
they were in police custody. Id. See also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) ("'[Iln
custody' for purposes of receiving of Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether
there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.").
120. See app. question 26. This question was first asked individually and again during group
interviews. In the group interviews, whenever a single participant offender asked, "What's the
difference?" all the others would chime in with, "Yeah! What's the difference?" Interview with
Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
121. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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versions of intimidation. l2 Twelve mimicked how the police intimi-
dated them by "threatening" them with "more jail time," "screaming
in [their] faces" and "pushing [or] jerking" them while still "cuf-
fed." '1 23 The rest said the police "did everything" to make them talk
but left them alone when they refused to say anything. 124
Probing into what they meant by "did everything" eleven respon-
dents explained that police "threatened" them with such statements
as:
(i) Your friend [accomplice] already told us what happened; you
can save yourself if you tell us what really happened;
(ii) We have enough on you to put you away a long time;
(iii) If you tell us the truth, we will see what we can do to reduce
your time/charges;
(iv) We are not interested in you; just give us the name of the big
guy and we will let you go, and
(v) It will be a long time before you see another Thanksgiving or
Christmas.1
25
Examined closely, the responses provided by the offenders point to
some form of "coercive custodial interrogation.' 1 26 The definition of
custodial interrogation, when applied to the responses gathered, raises
some interesting questions with regard to "coercive custodial
interrogation." 127
122. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Florida (June-Aug. 2008). In
their individual responses to app. question 25 (c), all of the participant offenders said that they
were either intimidated, threatened or harassed by the police. Id.
123. Responses to app. question 25(c) obtained from participant offenders through individ-
ual interviews.
124. Id.
125. Id. (responses provided by Participant Offenders 3, 4, 10, 12 and 19 respectively).
126. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560-61 (1980) (citations omitted) ("Although
Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates a limited exception to the rule that the privi-
lege must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive
custodial interrogations for which it was designed. The warnings protect persons who, exposed to
such interrogation without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable to make a free
and informed choice to remain silent."); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984).
The common usage of "custody" is any situation in which a reasonable individual would feel a
restraint on his or her movement such that he or she would not feel free to leave. Id.
127. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 454-56 (citations omitted) ("The interrogators sometimes are in-
structed to induce a confession out of trickery ... [and] the very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals .... [G]iven
this background, [the Miranda Court was concerned] primarily with this interrogation atmos-
phere and the evils it can bring."); Patane, 542 U.S. at 645-46 ("Miranda rested on insight into
the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise
of assessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it. Unless the police give the
prescribed warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custodial confession is inad-
missible, there being no need for the previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into volunta-
riness. That inducement to forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can
only atrophy if we turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwarned state-
ment leads investigators to tangible evidence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence,
but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the absence of a very good reason, the logic of
24
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For example, did the police tactic, "Your friend made a statement
against you," suggest that the police already acquired information and
that the offender should accept responsibility for the crime? 128 And,
does the statement, "We have enough to put you away for a long
time," serve to pressure the offender into confessing? 129 Furthermore,
do the statements, "If you tell us the truth we will see what we can do
to reduce your time," and "Just give us the name of the big guy and
we will let you go," constitute psychological ploys? Using the infor-
mation provided by respondents to answer the questions raised above,
it is difficult to conclude whether or not the police actions amounted
to trickery or "coercive custodial interrogation. '" 130
The verification of coercive custodial interrogation necessitates an
assessment of the totality of circumstances, including the actual tran-
scripts of police questioning, the conditions under, and stage at which,
the questioning occurred, as well as the stage at which counsel was
requested, granted and/or denied.'31 When informed of all of these,
almost all of the respondents expressed some form of disgust or irrita-
bility. 132 In their minds two points seem clear: (i) the police tried to
"force them to talk before" they were charged, and (ii) they were
questioned "before they had a lawyer," and therefore they were
"wrongfully questioned [interrogated]" by the police.' 33
Miranda should be followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion ... and the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of de-
rivative evidence .... ").
128. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). Par-
ticipant Offender 3 felt that the police were trying to pressure him into accepting responsibility
for the crime when they said to him his friend told them what occurred. In group discussions,
almost all the other offenders agreed with the explanation of Participant Offender 3. Id.
129. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
("The opinion of the Court in Miranda was devoted in large part to an elaborate discussion of
the subtle forms of psychological pressure which could be brought to bear when an accused
person is interrogated at length in unfamiliar surroundings. The 'salient features' of the cases
decided in Miranda were 'incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere.' The danger was that in such circumstances the confidence of the prisoner could be
eroded by techniques such as successive interrogations by police acting out friendly or unfriendly
roles. These techniques are best developed in 'isolation and unfamiliar surroundings,' And they
take time: 'the major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and perseverance.'
The techniques of an extended period of isolation, repeated interrogation, cajolery, and trickery
often enough produced admissions which were actually coerced in the traditional sense so that
new safeguards were deemed essential.").
130. Id.
131. See HOLTZ, supra note 66, at 654.
132. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008)
(groups ranging from three to eight offenders).
133. Id. Most respondents argued that being approached by a police who carries a gun, stick
and tazer already poses a threat to them. Others referred to being handcuffed as a "significant
loss of freedom" and being approached by more than one policeman as a "dangerous situation,"
referring to it as the "Rodney King drama." Id.
25
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Since all of the offenders who claimed wrongful interrogation by
the police completed their experience with the justice system by
means of a plea-bargain, the issue of "coercive custodial interroga-
tion" was never challenged or called into question.
134
THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
The Right to Counsel embraced in the Miranda Warning is
grounded in the Sixth Amendment, which provides for the accused in
criminal prosecutions to "have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence." '1 3 5 This right to an attorney is also said to be implicit in the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
does not expressly provide for the right to counsel, courts construe
that right as implicitly existing in the Fifth-Amendment setting as a
"preventive measure" that protects an accused from self-incrimina-
tion. The correlative right to counsel found in the Miranda warnings
is said to be necessary "to make the process of police interrogation
conform to the dictates of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege." '1 3
The attorney's presence when proceedings are initiated serves an im-
portant function in protecting the defendant's rights, including ensur-
ing that these rights are not violated by the State.'37 In light of this,
respondents were questioned whether they knew that they "have the
right to an attorney." '138 All twenty-four respondents answered
"yes."'1 39 However, when asked if they knew at what point in time of
their arrest they could request to have an attorney present, thirteen
said they were "not sure" or "not really sure," eight said when they
"go before a judge," and three said after they "give a statement" to
134. Id. Interview information gathered from participant offenders indicated that they pled
guilty in order to obtain lighter sentences or to prevent being sent to jail or prison. Most said
they did so because they had previous convictions which placed them at risk of being found
guilty and sent back to jail or prison. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
136. See HOLTZ, supra note 66, at 703.
137. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1971) (citations omitted) ("[lit has been firmly
established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him . . . . The
initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of
our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has
committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defen-
dant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces
of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.
It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which
alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.").
138. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
app. questions 13 and 19. As a follow-up question all participant offenders were asked individu-
ally if they knew they have the right to an attorney. Id.
139. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
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the police.14 ° As a follow-up, respondents were asked this question:
"Suppose you agree to make a statement and start talking to the po-
lice, can you stop at anytime and ask to have a lawyer present?" '141 To
this question, six respondents said "no" while nine stated they were
"not sure. "142 These fifteen respondents were also unsure whether the
police are required to cease questioning them if they asked for an at-
torney during the course of being questioned.1 43 The responses pro-
vided above clearly point to the issue of "knowledge and
understanding" of their rights. In Miranda the court declared, "If the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must
have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and have him present
during any subsequent questioning. 1' 4 4 Questioned as to what point
in time they first met with an attorney, nineteen said when they first
"went to court" or "went before the judge,' 45 while the remainder
stated they "don't really remember." '146
In the previous section of this paper, it was noted that eight respon-
dents declared that they "talked back" to the police. Of these, five
said that had they known they could ask for a "lawyer" at any time
during questioning, they would have done SO. 1 4 7
140. Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]o be effective, a request for
Miranda counsel must be made within 'the context of custodial interrogation' and no sooner.");
see also Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008) (ma-
jority of participant offenders saying that they met with an attorney after the court appointed
one for them).
141. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
app. question 21.
142. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). The
fifteen Participant Offenders who responded "no" or "not sure" to the question indicated they
had two to three arrests for which they pled guilty or received suspended sentences, and they
first met with an attorney after the court appointed one for them. Id.
143. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
also app. question 22. All fifteen expressed surprise when told that they could stop questioning
at any time during an interrogation and ask to have an attorney, with some saying, "that's news
to me," or things would have been different "if I knowed [sic] that." In probing for answers to
the question participant offenders were asked if the police were supposed to stop questioning
them if they asked to have an attorney present. The fifteen Participant Offenders who answered
"no" or "not sure" to appendix question 21, again expressed uncertainty. Id.
144. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
145. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
app. question 23. Except for Participant Offenders 5, 10, 12, 20 and 22, the majority of respon-
dents disclosed that they were assigned public defenders afterward or just before they appeared
in front of a judge. Id.
146. Interview with Participant Offenders 5, 10, 12, 20 and 22, in Leon County, Fla. (June-
Aug. 2008). Five respondents who had arrest-records as juveniles and into their early twenties
said they always met with attorneys but could not recall at what point in time. They did know
from their more recent arrests that the court appointed them attorneys when they went before a
judge. Id.
147. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 13, 17, 21 and 24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-
Aug. 2008).
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While it is difficult to validate whether or not respondents would
have asked for an attorney, had they known that they could have re-
quested to have one present at any time during their questioning, their
responses engender the issue of knowledge and understanding of their
rights. A person's knowledge and understanding of his right to counsel
is critical to his defense and should be granted before the person is
brought to trial.'48
WAIVER
The significance of waiver, in relation to Miranda and in plea bar-
gaining, cannot be underplayed. Ever since the Court's ruling that a
suspect may waive his Miranda Rights, 49 the waiver seems to have
taken on its own unique version of sanctity. Much utilized by law en-
forcement officers, waivers play crucial roles in the lives of
offenders.150
Given the use and significance of waivers within the legal system,
respondents were asked to explain what the term meant to them.151
Initially, most of them seemed confused; but in the course of their
interviews, eleven said, "give up your rights."' 52 Three joked that they
"plead the fifth," while others provided answers ranging from "I don't
know" or "not sure" to "talk to the police."' 53
Asked if they ever waived their rights, nine responded "yes" and
explained that they gave up their rights either because the police
promised to "let them go"'15 4 or "see what they can do,"' 55 if they
made a statement. Four added that they regretted their decisions. In
explaining why they regretted their decisions, they provided answers
all of which directed anger toward the police, such as, "the police used
148. Rothgery v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2591 (2008) ("[The attachment of the right to coun-
sel] occurs when the government has used the judicial machinery to signal a commitment to
prosecute .... Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of ap-
pointed counsel during any 'critical stage' of the postattachment proceedings; what makes a
stage critical is what shows the need for counsel's presence. Thus, counsel must be appointed
within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for adequate representation at any critical
stage before trial, as well as at trial itself.").
149. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
150. See id.
151. See app. question 25(n).
152. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
Eleven Participant Offenders, ranging between ages 25 and 30, stated that they had several ar-
rests and spent time in jail, prison or both. They waived their rights because they did not believe
that they had rights. Id.
153. Id. Participant Offenders 3, 10, and 15 said they pled the Fifth. Id.
154. Id. (participant Offenders 1, 3 and 5 explaining that they thought that "let them go,"
meant they would not be charged but found out later that such was not the case).
155. Id. (asking Participant Offenders 4, 8, 13, 17, 19, and 21 to explain what the phrase "see
what they can do," meant, respondents said that the police promised to talk to the prosecutor to
reduce the charge).
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it against me," ... "the police lied about what I said/told them,"...
"the cops tricked me,"' 56 .. . [and] "you can't trust the police/cops." '157
In a sort of contradictory claim, four respondents volunteered that
they provided "written statements" to the police and argued that since
they "didn't speak/talk to the police" they "didn't think" they gave up
their rights.' 58 They learned later when they went before a judge that
their "signed statement" meant they gave up their rights.159 When
questioned as to why they provided written statements to the police,
they all gave similar answers that "the police promised" to let them go
if they "write down what happened" and "sign it." They did, and were
"let ... go."160
With regard to the voluntary waiver of rights, a court may take a
number of factors into consideration such as a defendant's education,
intelligence and proper advisement of rights, among others in deliber-
ating a case and delivering a sentence.' 6 ' Informed of such considera-
tion, respondents were then asked for their feedback.16 2 Invariably,
the request for feedback drew laughter followed by comments such as:
"Who do you think the judge would believe, me or the cops?" "The
judge don't care how dumb you are. I seen some real dumb [expletive
deleted] people go to prison," "Which judge will believe a dumb [ex-
pletive deleted] do not know his [expletive deleted] rights," and "No
judge I know would think you dumb if can make money pushing
drugs. '"163
GUILTY, NOT GUILTY, OR No CONTEST (NOLO CONTENDERE)
Arrested and charged with a crime, a defendant is required to for-
mally answer to the charge(s) against him in the court of law." 4 The
formal answer, commonly referred to as a plea, revolves around ac-
156. Id. As a form of trickery, the police promised to speak with the prosecutor to reduce the
charge. As a former assistant state attorney, it has been my experience that law enforcement
may not legally bind such an agreement without pre-delegated authority on a case-by-case basis.
Responses provided by Participant Offenders 3, 5 and 13. Id.
157. Id. The angry responses directed toward the police is because respondents felt "be-
trayed" since the "police did not keep their word" in asking for leniency. Response provided by
Participant Offender 8, who said that the police promised to ask for leniency if he made a state-
ment to them. The police then used his statement against him in court. Id.
158. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008) (re-
sponses provided by Participant Offenders 1, 8, 13 and 19).
159. Id. At the time of the interview, respondents continued to claim that they did not give
up their rights and that they simply wrote down "a few things" so they could be released. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065 (11th Cir. 1986).
162. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 8, 13, 19, 22 and 24, in Leon County, Fla.
(June-Aug. 2008) (group interview with participant offenders, all of whom had multiple arrests).
163. Id.
164. See WILLIAM CLARK & WILLIAM MIKELL, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 421-
25 (2d ed. 1918).
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ceptance or denial of guilt.'65 Customarily, defendants are asked to
enter a plea of guilty, not guilty, or no contest to the charges brought
against them.166
Guilty and Not Guilty: Overall, respondent offenders had little dif-
ficulty in explaining the "guilty plea" as admitting to committing the
offenses for which they were charged and the "not guilty plea," as
claiming that they did not commit the offenses as charged.' 67 So as
not to evoke respondents' sensitivities, respondents were not asked
whether they were guilty or not guilty of the crimes for which they
were charged. 68
No Contest: In attempts to explain the "no contest plea," some mis-
understanding on the part of respondents became evident. Nine indi-
cated that they were unsure of the meaning while fifteen explained
that a "no contest plea" meant that they did not accept guilt or inno-
cence to the charges or offense.169 Upon further query, it became
clear that all fifteen respondents who correctly defined "no contest"
felt that "no judgment was made against them" as a result of their "no
contest plea."'170 When asked why they felt that "no judgment was
made against them," some said because they "did not serve time" in
jail or prison, while others said, "because [they] served thirty days" or
"three months in prison," and/ or were "put on probation.' 171 When
asked whether they knew that a 'no contest plea' meant that they
were placed under or subjected to the same consequences as a "guilty
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
app. question 25 (d), (e).
168. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). The
research literature cautions against the use of sensitive questions which regularly serve to evoke
anger in respondents and cause them to withdraw from participating in the study.
169. Id.; see app. question 25 (f). The nine Participant Offenders who were unsure of the
meaning of "no contest plea" had between two to three arrests and explained that their attor-
neys instructed them how to plead. The fifteen Participant Offenders who explained the phrase
meant that they did not accept guilt or innocence to the charges explained that after going to
court several times and "serving time," they became more familiar with the phrase. They all
associated their no contest plea with serving little or no time or being placed on probation. And,
when informed that the legal consequences of a no contest plea are the same as a guilty plea,
they all expressed disbelief or doubt. Id.
170. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
171. Id.
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plea, 172 several appeared shocked, with the majority expressing
doubt. 73
MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY
A criminal charge brought against a suspect is usually classified as a
misdemeanor or felony according to the severity of the crime commit-
ted.174 Considered less serious than a felony, a misdemeanor custom-
arily carries a penalty of a fine or incarceration in a local confinement
facility for a period usually less than a year, 75 while a felony, consid-
ered to being of a more serious nature, carries a penalty of imprison-
ment or death (capital felony). 7 6 A suspect found guilty of felony is
placed in state or federal prison for a period of a year or more. 77
In questioning respondents regarding a misdemeanor and felony,
their responses suggested that they understood the difference between
the two types of charges. Eleven, however, stressed that they "didn't
know" the difference the first time they were arrested, while a few
others were unsure when they became aware of the difference be-
tween a misdemeanor and a felony.1 7 1 They all claimed they learned
the difference over time, after repeated arrests or repeated
imprisonment.
79
Interestingly, thirteen respondents admitted to having "juvenile
records", six of whom acknowledged that they became aware that
their charges were more serious 180 than the previous ones because
they were not allowed to go free, "put on probation" or had to "come
up with bond money" in order to be released.' 8 ' Six of the twenty-four
172. See generally Vinson v. State, 345 So. 2d 711, 715 (Fla. 1977); Allen v. State, 474 S.W.2d
480, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); People v. Robinson, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 409 (Ca. App. 3d
1997); State v. Nelson, 819 A.2d 905, 907 (Conn. App. 2003); Clauson v. Commonwealth, 511
S.E.2d 449, 454 (Va. App. 1999); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Wis.
1998); Burch v. State, 738 P.2d 157, 158 (Okla. App. 1987) (noting that in many states, a plea of
nolo contendere or guilty has the same legal effect or consequence).
173. See Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
174. See CLARK & MIKELL, supra note 164; see also United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751,
774-75 (1997).
175. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970).
176. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 400 n.5 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 70 ("States... distinguish.., between misdemeanors and felonies
in determining such things as whether confinement shall be in county or regional jails, rather
than state prison.").
178. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
179. Id. Throughout the interviews, respondents who served time in prison demonstrated
that they have a better grasp of the legal terms and phrases. Id.
180. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 8, 13, 19, 24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug.
2008) (showing that what was discovered was not that the charges were "more serious" but that,
in the majority of cases, respondents violated probation in addition to the charges against them,
thereby adding to their penalties).
181. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 8, 9, 13, 19, 24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-
Aug. 2008) (revealing that Participant Offenders 1, 4, 13 and 24 said they knew their charges
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respondents who served over a year in jail said if they knew the conse-
quences of a felony, they would have steered clear of "drugs.' '1 82
PROBATION AND PAROLE
Probation and parole, two closely related legal terms, govern of-
fenders' release with prescribed sets of conditions. 183 Probation,
granted by a court, is usually given to a person in lieu of confinement
or imprisonment, while parole, granted by a paroling authority or
board, is usually extended to someone after a period of confine-
ment. 184 To determine ex-offenders' understanding of probation and
parole, inquiry was made into whether they heard these terms
before.185 All twenty-four respondents said that they had heard the
terms and acknowledged to having served probation on more than
186
one occasion.
Despite their awareness of the terms probation and parole, offend-
ers experienced difficulties in explaining the differences between the
two concepts. 187 During the course of several days of interviews, it
became apparent that respondents view probation as behavioral mis-
conduct, which they deem to be "small time"'18 8 or tied to "not so
serious crime," and parole as actions of a more "serious" nature. 89
were more serious because they were not placed on probation; participant Offenders 8 and 19
said they had to secure bond money in order to be released).
182. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 3, 4, 13, 19, 22, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug.
2008). These offenders were charged with possession of crack cocaine for which they received
prison time. See FLA. STAT. §§ 893.13, 893.135 (2008).
183. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 860 (2006) ("A parolee, like a probationer, is set
free in the world subject to restrictions intended to facilitate supervision and guard against anti-
social behavior. As with probation, 'the State is willing to extend parole only because it is able to
condition it upon compliance with certain requirements.' . . . Certainly, parole differs from pro-
bation insofar as parole is 'meted out in addition to, not in lieu of, incarceration.' . . . And,
certainly, parolees typically will have committed more serious crimes-ones warranting a prior
term of imprisonment-than probationers. The latter distinction, perhaps, would support the con-
clusion that a State has a stronger interest in supervising parolees than it does in supervising
probationers... '[T]here is no constitutional difference between probation and parole for pur-
poses of the [F]ourth [A]mendment."').
184. Id.
185. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008) (as a
screening question to app. question 32, participant offenders were asked if they heard the terms
"probation and parole" before).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 14, 19, in Leon County, Fla. (June-
Aug. 2008) (respondents considering such offenses as fighting and smoking marijuana as "small
time" crimes).
189. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19, 24, in Leon County, Fla.
(June-Aug.2008) (respondents referring to car-jacking and selling drugs as serious offenses).
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Parolees: Of the total number of respondents, seven1 90 identified
themselves as parolees.191 Although aware of the terms probation and
parole, paroled offenders used the word "probation" instead of "pa-
role" throughout their conversations, to describe their conditions of
release. They also used the term "probation officer" instead of "pa-
role officer" as the person who has legal supervisory authority over
them.' 92 Asked to explain why they referred to their parole officers as
probation officers, parolees either exclaimed, "what's the difference?"
or "what's the big deal?" Probing into these responses revealed that
parolees harbor varying degrees of resentment and mistrust for proba-
tion and parole officers.1 93 The shared conviction is that probation
and parole officers are officials of the criminal justice system who are
not interested in their rehabilitation but in "looking" for excuses to
keep them "locked up."' 9 4 In explaining to respondents that parole is
tied to a criminal sentence while probation is not, the responses re-
mained fairly the same. Only one parolee made a distinction between
probation and parole. Expressing his understanding with anger in his
voice, he said,
The police can pick me up for something I didn't do just to put me
back in prison. They did it before, and they waited three months to
prove I didn't do it.' 95 Parole didn't do me no good because I didn't
have much [prison] time left anyway. This never happened when I
serve probation .... When I broke [violated] probation, they ex-
tended my time [conditional freedom] but did not throw me in jail, but
when they [the police] say I broke parole, they cut [reduced] my time
[conditional release].' 9 6
190. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, in Leon County, Fla. (June-
Aug.2008) (stating that four Participant Offenders: 1, 4, 13 and 19, served time in prison for drug
possession, two: 17 and 21 for stealing and one: 15 for assault).
191. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, in Leon County, Fla. (June-
Aug. 2008). At the time of their interviews, four respondents: 1, 13, 15 and 17, had successfully
completed the conditions of their parole while three 4, 19, and 21 were still serving parole. As
used here, the term "parolee" refers to individuals who have already completed their conditions
as well as those who were still out on parole.
192. Interview with Participant Offenders 1, 4, 19, 21, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008)
(despite being on parole, four respondents: 1, 4, 19 and 21 continued to refer to their parole
officers as probation officers and when asked why they all said they are "not big time"
criminals).
193. Id. All seven parolees used expletives to describe their parole officer.
194. Id.
195. Interview with Participant Offender 8, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). This re-
spondent was initially stopped for jay walking. When asked for identification, he presented his
driver's license to the police who, after a quick verification check, arrested the respondent for
"false identification." Because he was on parole, he was charged with parole violation as well as
false identification. He was released after three months when police found that someone else
had used his identification information when arrested for committing a crime in Miami. Id.
196. Id. Charged with a misdemeanor, the respondent received one year probation, which he
violated. As a result, he received eighteen months probation with stricter conditions. On an-
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In a follow-up interview with this offender, he pointed out that he, as
well as most of his "homeboys" [friends], detested confinement in jail
or prison and that "breaking" parole "put you back in jail" quicker
than "breaking probation.' '19 7
Probationers: Of the seventeen respondents who received proba-
tion, eleven candidly admitted their lack of understanding of "parole"
as the difference between the length of the sentence and the amount
of time served in jail or prison. They also acknowledged confusion
over the fact that violating parole could result in serving the entire
sentence imposed by the court.' 98 And when informed that parole vio-
lation could result in serving additional time, the majority responded
with doubt. 199
ADJUDICATION WITHHELD AND SUSPENDED SENTENCE
Adjudication withheld and suspended sentence are two legal con-
cepts that presented a greater degree of difficulty for respondents to
explain."' ° To highlight the various responses, these concepts will be
discussed separately.
Adjudication Withheld: Acknowledging that they heard the term
"adjudication withheld" before, all of the respondents displayed un-
easiness or indifference when asked to explain what the concepts
meant to them.20 ' After much probing and encouragement the follow-
ing explanations were provided:
other occasion, while out on parole, the respondent was arrested for violating parole and had to
serve out the length of his sentence. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Six of the seven parolee Participant Offenders: 1, 4, 13, 15, 17 and 19 received time
off for good behavior during the time of parole. However, many were angry that the time
credited for good behavior was not subtracted from the remainder of their sentence when they
violated parole, thereby causing them to serve a longer sentence. Unfortunately for many indi-
gent defendants, these issues are not properly addressed during their proceedings. Id.
199. Id. Four of the seven parolee Participant Offenders 1. 4, 13 and 17 Respondents stated
that they did not "know nothing [sic] what [they were] talking about," in reference to parole
violation. Id.
200. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. question 25(k), (1) (in comparison to "guilty and not guilty," or "probation and parole").
201. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008) (dis-
cussing with Participant Offenders 3, 6, 11, 16 and 18; some stood up then sat again, some stared
out in the distance while others uttered something meaningless and ended up repeating, "that's
not it.") Participant Offender 20 said, "I'm not sure, but I'm not stupid." Id.
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TABLE 4
RESPONDENTS' EXPLANATIONS OF
ADJUDICATION WITHHELD
EXPLANATIONS OF ADJUDICATION NUMBER OF
WITHHELD RESPONDENTS
The judge didn't make a decision/pass judgment 6
The judge threw out the case 3
The judge dismissed the case 5
The judge didn't find the person guilty 4
Don't know [the meaning] 4
(Did not provide an answer) 2
TOTAL 24
The varied responses presented in the above table help to illustrate
respondents' lack of understanding of adjudication withheld.2°2  As
the data show, twelve respondents felt in the withholding of adjudica-
tion, the case was either "thrown out," dismissed, or the person found
not guilty.20 3 As such, they argued that all "charges are dropped" and
that there is "no criminal record., 2 4 And, in following up with the six
respondents who said the judge "didn't make a decision" or "pass
judgment," none accepted that the withholding of judgment is tied to
specified conditions of behavior and that the case could be reopened
for violating the conditions.20 5
202. Id.; see app. question 25(k). Adjudication Withheld is defined under deferred judgment
as, "A judgment placing a convicted defendant on probation, the successful completion of which
will prevent entry of the underlying judgment of conviction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 859
(8th ed. 2004); Raulerson v. State, 763 So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla. 2000). ("Pursuant to [Florida's]
statutory scheme, a defendant who has adjudication of guilt withheld and successfully completes
the term of probation imposed 'is not a convicted person."'); State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242, 243-
44 (Fla. 1971). ("[T]he term 'conviction' means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or
by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court. It is important to distinguish a
'judgment of conviction' which is defective unless it contains an adjudication of guilt. A judg-
ment of conviction is a necessary prerequisite to a valid sentence .... [A judgment of conviction]
does not necessarily include an adjudication, whereas [a conviction] does.")
203. Id. (response to appendix question 25(k), three Participant Offenders 2, 5, and 11 stat-
ing that the judge threw out the case, five, 7, 9, 16, 18 and 23 stating that the judge dismissed the
case, and four 12: 15: 17 and 22 stating that the judge found the person not guilty).
204. Id. Many defendants in my experience have confused a withhold of adjudication with a
sealed record of criminal history. Id.
205. Id. (responses provided by Participant Offenders 1, 3, 6, 10, 14, 20. ); Raulerson, 763 So.
2d at 290. ("[I1f probation is revoked, the defendant must be adjudicated guilty of the charged
offense .... Applying [Florida's] statutory scheme to the issue at hand, it becomes apparent that
there are two possible alternatives when one charged with a violation of [probation] has [had]
adjudication of guilt withheld ... either the term of probation will be successfully completed, in
which event the defendant will not have been convicted at all; or probation will be revoked, in
which case the defendant must be adjudicated guilty .... ).
20091
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Suspended sentence: Although respondents did not express the
same types of uneasiness or indifferences when asked to explain in
their own words what a suspended sentence meant to them, a look at
their responses in the table below indicates some degree of confusion.
TABLE 5
RESPONDENTS' EXPLANATIONS OF SUSPENDED SENTENCE
EXPLANATIONS OF SUSPENDED SENTENCE NUMBER OF
RESPONDENTS
The case was suspended/dismissed 5
The judge dropped all charges 6
The judge sentenced you, then changed his mind 2
The judge put you on probation and make you pay 4
court cost
Not guilty 4
Don't know [the meaning] 2
(Did not provide an answer) 1
TOTAL 24
The responses presented in Table 5 indicate offenders' explanations
regardings the meanings of suspended sentence.2 °6 In discussing their
answers and explaining to them what the concept meant, fourteen re-
spondents admitted that they guessed the meanings in order not to
"look dumb [or] stupid. ' 20 7 They admitted that since they either re-
ceived or know of a friend who received a suspended sentence, they
should be able to "at least guess" what the term meant.2 0 8 Twenty-two
respondents claimed that they knew that both "adjudication withheld"
and 'suspended sentence' had something to do with "not serving jail
time" or "not going to jail" and as such, used their own their own
experiences or explanations provided by friends to "come up" with or
"think" of a meaning.2 0 9
206. A suspended sentence is defined as, "A sentence postponed so that the defendant is not
required to serve time unless he or she commits another crime or violates some other court-
imposed condition. A suspended sentence, in effect, is a form of probation." BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 1394 (8th ed. 2004).
207. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). The
phrase "look dumb" was used by Participant Offenders 1, 4 and 8; the phrase "look stupid," was
used by Participant Offenders 5 and 14. These phrases were used by the majority of respondent
offenders during group interviews. Id.
208. Id. (responses provided by Participant Offenders 4, 8 and 14).
209. Id. Of the twenty-four Participant Offenders, 13 and 24 openly admitted that they did
not know the meanings of adjudication withheld or suspended sentence, and made no effort in
trying to explain the phrases. Id.
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PLEA BARGAIN
Once approved by the U.S. Supreme Court,21° plea bargaining
evolved to be an integral part of prosecutorial negotiations.211 Com-
monly used on behalf of defendants to secure prosecutorial conces-
sions,212 such as a lesser charge and/or reduced sentence in exchange
for an offender's guilty plea, plea bargaining is viewed by many sus-
pects as a viable option to avoid severe sentences.21 3
To assess disadvantaged ex-offenders' understanding of plea bar-
gaining, respondents were asked whether they had used this option
and why.214 Thirteen said they plea bargained at least once, while
eleven said they did so more than once. In explaining why they plea
bargained, they provided the varied answers presented in the table
below:
210. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("This phase of the process of criminal
justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circum-
stances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.").
211. G. NICHOLAs HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1997) ("Approximately 90% of all crimi-
nal cases are resolved through plea bargaining.").
212. Moore v. Czerniak, 534 F.3d 1128, 1193 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Prosecutorial charging and
plea bargaining decisions are particularly ill-suited for broad judicial oversight. In the first place,
they involve exercises of judgment and discretion that are often difficult to articulate in a man-
ner suitable for judicial evaluation. Such decisions are normally made as a result of careful
professional judgment as to the strength of the evidence, the availability of resources, the visibil-
ity of the crime and the likely deterrent effect on the particular defendant and others similarly
situated. Even were it able to collect, understand and balance all of these factors, a court would
find it nearly impossible to lay down guidelines to be followed by prosecutors in future cases.").
213. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261 ("Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of en-
forced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even
while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it en-
hances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately im-
prisoned."); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970).
214. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008); see
app. question 25(m). As a screening question to appendix question 25(m), Participant Offenders
were asked if they ever plea bargained and why. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in
Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
37
Persaud: Conceptualizations of Legalese in the Course of Due Process, from
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
144 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:107
TABLE 6
RESPONDENTS REASONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING
NUMBER OF
REASONS FOR PLEA BARGAIN REPNENTSRESPONDENTS
Did not want to go to jail 7
To get a lesser sentence 5
Did not want to go back to jail 5
To reduce charges 4
To reduce charges and get a lesser sentence 3
TOTAL 24
In interview discussions with respondents, they all declared that they
simply followed the advice of their attorneys the first time they plea
bargained. 15 Asked why they did, twenty-two said because they were
"afraid to go to jail," or that they were told by their attorneys that
they would be "sent to jail" or "prison," or that being "ex-cons [they]
don't stand a chance" of not "going back to jail." '216 With regard to the
response of being ex-cons who do not stand a chance, respondents
said they were "picked up" for being with the wrong group or being
"in the wrong place" and felt that, as a result, they would be sent back
to jail/ prison for violating probation or parole hence their plea to a
"lesser charge." 217
Some may argue that no one would enter a guilty plea for a crime he
or she did not commit, but a person living in conditions of poverty
who is charged with a minor crime and refuses to plead guilty will only
guarantee himself or herself a longer stay in jail awaiting a hearing -
often longer than the likely sentence to be imposed upon conviction
through a guilty plea.218
215. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
Twenty-one Participant Offenders said they were represented by public defenders while three 1;
4 and 19, said they had pro-bono attorneys. In group interviews, all twenty-four said they plea
bargained because they were advised by their attorneys to do so. Id. See RoBINSON, supra note
19, at 223 ("Since the poor are by definition, indigent, they are more likely to be served by public
attorneys.").
216. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). Par-
ticipant Offenders 16 and 23 did not provide a response while some who served time in prison,
Participant Offenders 1, 4, 19, 21 and 24 said they pleaded because they were "not going back to
jail." Id.
217. Id. (responses provided by Participant Offenders 1, 4, 19, 21 and 24).
218. RoBINSON, supra note 19, at 219 (citations omitted); see Robert D. Miller, Symposium,
An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Explotation, and the Law: III. Coerced Confine-
ment and Treatment: The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in
the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 1169, 1185 (1997) (discussing
forced evaluation and treatment in the criminal justice system).
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Nine who admitted to serving time in jail more than once and four
who served time in prison said they regretted their plea bargain the
first time.21 9 In explaining their regrets, they all alleged that their
guilty plea made them targets of subsequent arrests and confinement,
something they did not know the first time they pleaded. 22 ° And, had
they known this to be the case, they would have fought "the charges,"
instead of pleading.22 1
Of the thirteen respondents who expressed regrets for plea bargain-
ing, seven appeared distraught about their future.222 Ranging from
ages twenty-seven through thirty, they commented repeatedly on their
delinquent past and questioned their future. 23 They no longer saw
the streets as a way of life, an alternative to schooling or working at a
supermarket or department store.224 As a twenty-nine year old re-
peated offender expressed:
Sometimes, I don't know what I am going to do anymore. Just when I
try to get my life together, the cops pick me up 'cause I look like
somebody, so they say. And when they run my record, they see all
219. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). Four
Participant Offenders; 1, 4, 19 and 21; who served time in both jail and prison, were most vocal in
expressing regret for plea bargaining. Id.; see also MATrHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LAN-
GAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS 2 (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf ("In 2004 an estimated
1,078,920 persons were convicted of a felony in State courts, a vast majority (95%) of whom
pleaded guilty. The 1.1 million persons were convicted and sentenced for about 1.5 million fel-
ony offenses during 2004."); see also PATRICK A. LANGAN & ROBYN L. COHEN, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED
FELONS 41 (1992), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdflnjrp92.pdf. In a previous report, the
government noted that "[p]lea bargains, in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in ex-
change for dropped or reduced charges or in exchange for a reduced sentence, is a common
practice in the criminal justice system. The proportion of those who pleaded guilty as part of a
plea bargain is not known." See COHEN, supra.
220. ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 13; see also Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in
Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008). Respondents' regrets appear consistent with the claim that,
"When crimes are committed nearby, especially when they fit the modus operandi (M.O.) of a
known offender out on parole, he or she is automatically considered a likely suspect." Interview
with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
221. Id.
222. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (1968) ("No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in
this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until
restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."); Johnson v. Governor of State of Florida, 405
F.3d 1214, 1216-17 n.1, 3 (11th Cir. 2005) ("A felon who has completed his sentence may apply
for clemency to have his civil rights restored .... Under Florida's Rules of Executive Clemency,
however, the right to vote can still be granted to felons who cannot afford to pay restitution ....
The Clemency Board is made up of the Governor of Florida and members of the Cabinet. The
Clemency Board has the power to restore the civil rights of convicted felons, including the right
to vote."); see Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
In the end, a felon who is stripped of his civil rights or a person with a criminal record normally
has difficulties finding gainful employment. Participant Offenders 1, 3, 4, 8, 19, 21 and 27 who
appeared distraught about the future ranged between ages 27 to 30. Id.
223. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
224. Id.
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these charges, since I was small, and they haul me in ... I try to stay
straight but they don't give me a chance. I am just angry 'cause I
plead so many times just 'cause I didn't want no jail time ... and now I
have all this record ... for what ... for nothing. When I look at my
young hommies today, they don't know, they just don't know.., they
don't got [sic] no future? 225
The above comments fit the pattern of regret expressed by most of the
older respondents.226 At an earlier age, they all saw plea bargaining as
a way to receive reduced sentences or prevent confinement. But as
they grew older and took retrospective glances at their lives, they be-
gan to question not only their decisions to plea bargain but also the
"fairness" in this method of dispensing justice.2 2 7
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prose-
cutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is
an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly ad-
ministered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were sub-
jected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court
facilities. 228
In the haste to dispense justice through plea bargaining, the Court
may have left the door open for misuse that serve to negatively impact
young lives and foster hopelessness that fuels the cycle of
criminality.229
CONCLUSION
On a daily basis, defense attorneys and prosecutors negotiate and
dispose of hundreds of cases in the United States by way of the plea
bargaining process. The process in which an accused agrees to plead
guilty to a lesser charge, a reduced sentence, or both affects the lives
of a vast number of suspects, the majority of whom are poor, typically
minorities, who possess little formal education.23 ° The plea, negoti-
ated primarily between defense attorneys and prosecutors, results in
suspects giving up rights guaranteed under the Constitution, such as
equal protection and due process of law.2 a1
For disadvantaged groups in general, African Americans in particu-
lar, these rights are not relinquished suddenly at the plea bargain
225. Interview with Participant Offender 19, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
226. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008) Older
respondents refer to those between ages 27 and 30.
227. Id.
228. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
229. ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 219-20.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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stage; they begin to gradually erode from the time of arrest.232 As
shown in this study, for disadvantaged African Americans, the erosion
of these rights provided under equal protection and due process of law
result from a lack of understanding over the course of criminal pro-
ceedings from Miranda to the plea bargaining phase. 33 Couched in
legal terms and phrases, these rights manifest themselves in a wide
array of interlocking policies and procedures confusing to the person
of common intelligence.
For example, disadvantaged African American suspects who partic-
ipated in this study knew that they should not say anything to law
enforcement officers (right to remain silent) but did not understand
how it relates to self-incrimination. 34 Similarly, while they were told
they have the right to an attorney, they expressed confusion whether
they should have asked for one and at what point.235 In addition, the
majority did not understand the concept of waiver and the conse-
quences of waiving their rights.236 Finally, in agreeing to plea bargain,
they were not fully cognizant that it could mean accepting guilt with
specified conditions that could lead to graver consequences if these
conditions were not met.237
Overall, the respondents in this study indicated that they acquired
their knowledge of equal protection and due process rights incre-
232. Id.
233. Id. "Not surprisingly, plea bargaining results in a bias against poor clients, who are typi-
cally minorities, as well as the uneducated, who may not even know what is being done to them
in the criminal justice process." COLE, supra note 1, at 243-44.
234. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008).
Asked individually if the right to remain silent has anything to do with protection against self-
incrimination, all of the participant offenders said they were not sure or did not know. Partici-
pant Offender 20 asked, "What the __ is self-incrimination anyway?" See app. question 17.
235. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. questions 13, 16, 19 & 21. Given a copy of the Miranda rights to read, the majority of
respondents read it without stumbling. Almost all, however, struggled to explain the meaning of
it. All the participant offenders identified the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney
as their rights. However, they could not provide reasons for being silent, and questioned why
they should remain silent if they were telling the truth. They were also unsure whether the right
to an attorney meant that they had to hire their own lawyer or that they would have a court
appointed lawyer. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug
2008).
236. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. question 25(n). The angry responses directed toward the police happened because the par-
ticipant offenders felt "betrayed" since "the police did not keep their word" in asking for leni-
ency. Response by Participant Offender 8: "You can't trust the police/cops." Participant
Offender 8 stated that the police promised to ask for leniency if he made a statement to them,
but instead used his statement against him in court. Interview with Participant Offenders 8, in
Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008).
237. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. question 25(m). Four of the twenty-four participant offenders, who served time in both jail
and prison were most vocal in expressing regret for plea bargaining. Interview with Participant
Offenders 1-24 in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008).
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mentally, over the course of three or four arrests.238 They noted that
during their first encounters with the police they did not understand
the process.2 3 9 Several also admitted that their understanding was still
very limited.24 ° One area in which most of the respondents expressed
initial difficulty in understanding was in having an accomplice testify
against them. 24 ' As many expressed, 'He [the witness] planned the
'whole thing' yet he 'got no [jail] time. "242
Acknowledging that their first encounters with the criminal justice
system came while they were still juveniles, the majority explained
that they felt they understood the process by the time they became
adults.243 This perception, they said, ultimately proved incorrect as,
with each new arrest, the penalties became harsher, and obtaining re-
lease became increasingly difficult.244 Many claimed that, as adults,
the police began to "trump up" additional charges against them just to
"make them serve time. '245 "How can this be right?" several of them
238. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. question 11. One respondent said that he learned from a prison inmate that when the police
asks you, "Where do you live?" they are trying to find out "if you live close to the scene of the
crime," especially if "you been to prison before." All of the respondents said they became aware
of these rights over time, over the course of more than one arrest or by talking to their "hom-
mies" (friends) or members of their families who served time in jail or prison. Interview with
Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug. 2008).
239. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. question 5. Several respondents said they were first read their rights years ago when they
became juvenile offenders. Almost all of these respondents stated that "because they were "so
young/small" they didn't understand much of "anything." Four offenders who spent time in both
jail and prison recited the Miranda Warnings and disclosed that they were read their rights
"quite a few" times and therefore remember it "by heart." Interview with Participant Offenders
1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008).
240. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008) (re-
sponses of Participant Offenders 2, 7, 9, 16, 18 & 23).
241. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app., Group Discussion (group discussions during which participant offenders verbally lashed
out against accomplices who testified against them, often referring to them in derogatory terms
filled with expletives).
242. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008) (re-
sponses of Participant Offenders 1, 8, 19, 21 & 24).
243. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. question 5 (where nine respondents disclosed voluntarily that they were arrested as
juveniles). By the end of the study, the vast majority of participant offenders disclosed that they
had juvenile records. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug
2008).
244. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. Group Discussion (where almost all of the participant offenders talked about the difficulties
in securing their release as their arrest record grew). Those who did not, Participant Offenders
16, 18 & 23, were all 20 years old. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County,
Fla. (June-Aug 2008).
245. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008); see
app. Group Discussion (responses provided by Participant Offenders 4, 8 & 19 at group discus-
sion while others voiced agreement).
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asked.246 One ex-convict who spent over seven years in correctional
facilities, jails, and prisons seemed to sum-up the situation best when
he said,
Most of the guys, I know, learn about the court system over time, go-
ing back to prison again and again. What they never learn is the con-
sequences that come after, the difficulties, the problems that come
later in life. It's good to plead, "I will take six months," or "Cut it
down to eighteen [months] and I will sign," or, "If I can get out before
Christmas, I will go for it [prosecutor's offer of jail time]." Then,
when they turn 29-30, they have nowhere to go, no jobs, no money, no
car, no life, no nothing. By then it's too late. For me it's too late, and
I am only 29. My gran-momma used to warn me about it [going to
prison] but I didn't care then. Everyone I know my age was in
trouble, or been to jail or prison. I was a "juvie" [juvenile offender]. I
didn't know what was happening to me then. I served time [in jail and
prison]. Still, I don't understand a lot of things, and all the words they
[prosecutors and judges] use make me look like a hardened criminal.
All I want to do is to get my life straight ... but the cops won't let me
* .. picking me up for even crossing the street [jaywalking]. 247
Although this study is of limited scope, it does point to a crucial issue
affecting disadvantaged suspects; the fundamental issue of a defen-
dant's adequate understanding of his or her rights. Given the growing
overpopulation of poorly educated African Americans in jails and
prisons today, it is perhaps time to expand the boundaries of the de-
bate so as to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the is-
sue of the language of the law from the standpoint of the person of
common intelligence.
246. Interview with Participant Offenders 1-24, in Leon County, Fla. (June-Aug 2008).
247. Id.
2009]
43
Persaud: Conceptualizations of Legalese in the Course of Due Process, from
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
150 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:107
APPENDIX (INTERVIEW QUESTIONS)
A person who is arrested, questioned, and charged by the police is entitled to
certain rights. He is expected to understand these rights, the processing steps
he is going through, the charges against him, and the language (words and
phrases) used throughout the process. I am interested in finding out whether or
not you understood these things starting from the point of your arrest to plea
bargain, only if you were arrested and charged with a crime after your eight-
eenth birthday.
I would like for you to take part in my study. If you do take part, your identity
would not be disclosed, and the information you provide to me would be kept
confidential and used only for my study and possibly a journal article. You do
not have to participate in this study if you do not want to do so. If you decide to
participate and want to change your mind afterwards, you can quit talking to
me at any time you so desire.
1. How old are you (DOB)?
2. What is the highest grade you completed in school?
Under 7 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th
3. What is your yearly income? $
4. Since your eighteenth birthday, how many times were you arrested by the po-
lice? (Number of arrests).
5. Did the police ever read you your (Miranda) rights?
6. Have you ever served time in:
a. Jail
b. Prison
c. Both jail and prison
7. How long (months or years) have you served in prison?
I would now like to ask you some questions and talk with you about your (Mi-
randa) rights. Please DO NOT feel that you have to make up an answer or an
explanation. If you do not have an answer just let me know and we will go on to
the next question.
8. What type of crime were you charged with when the police first read you your
(Miranda) rights?
9. How many times in all did the police ever read you your (Miranda) rights?
10. At what point in time during your arrest did the police read you your rights?
11. When do you think the police are supposed to read you your (Miranda) rights?
12. When was the first time you became aware of your (Miranda) rights?
13. What would you say are Miranda rights?
44
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14. Did you say anything to the police when they first arrested you? Please explain
why (or why not).
15. [If respondent talked to the police]. What did you say to the police?
16. Please explain what the right to remain silent means to you.
17. Do you think the right to remain silent has anything to do with protection against
self incrimination? Please explain your answer.
18. What do you think, can and will be held against you in the court of law means?
19. Please explain what the right to an attorney means to you.
20. At what point in time of your arrest do you think you can ask the police to have
an attorney present?
21. Suppose you agree to make a statement and start talking to the police, can you
stop at any time and ask to have a lawyer present?
22. Suppose you ask for an attorney while the police are questioning you, what
should the police do?
23. At what point in time during your arrest did you meet with an attorney for the
first time?
24. Did you ever waive (give up) your (Miranda) rights? Explain why.
I am now going to mention some words and phrases and would like for you to
tell me which ones you have heard before. I would also like for you to explain
them if you can and then discuss each one with you. If you do not know the
meaning of a word or phrase, just let me know and we will go on to the next
one.
25. Explain to me, if you could, the meaning of the following words?
a. Custody
b. Interrogation
c. Custodial Interrogation
d. Guilty
e. Not Guilty
f. No Contest
g. Misdemeanor
h. Felony
i. Probation
j. Parole
k. Adjudication withheld
1. Suspended sentence
m. Plea bargain
n. Waiver
If, in the course of the interview the following issues are not addressed, ask
respondents the questions below and probe for answers whenever necessary.
2009]
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26. At what point in time during your arrest would you say that the police, took you
into custody?
27. Do you think there is a difference between arrest and custody? Please explain
your answer.
28. When a person voluntarily waives his rights, the court is supposed to consider the
person's level of education, intelligence and proper advisement of rights before
making a decision on his case.
a. Do you think this is true?
b. Why do you think this is (or not) true?
29. How many times have you pled guilty? Please explain why.
30. How many times have you pled not guilty? Please explain.
31. Do you think there is a difference between a felony and a misdemeanor? Please
explain.
32. Do you think there is a difference between probation and parole? Please explain.
33. Please explain to me in some detail about one or more of your arrest(s) from the
time the police arrived to the time you plea bargained.
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